DEPLOYMENT OF THREATS AND TRANSACTIONAL DIPLOMACY IN ADVANCING NATIONAL INTEREST: THE DONALD TRUMP REGIME EXPERIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES

Abstract

This study examines the strategic deployment of threats by Donald Trump as an instrument for advancing United States national interests. Situating his foreign policy within the theoretical frameworks of coercive diplomacy and deterrence theory, the paper analyzes how economic sanctions, tariff escalations, military signaling, and alliance pressure were used to compel behavioral change from both adversaries and allies. Through case studies including the U.S.–China trade war, tariff threats against Mexico over migration enforcement, burden-sharing disputes within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and strategic confrontations with North Korea, Venezuela, Greenland Demark and Iran, the paper evaluates the credibility, effectiveness, and consequences of threat-based diplomacy. The analysis finds that Trump’s approach was characterized by transactional realism, public signaling, and a willingness to impose or threaten significant costs to achieve concessions. While this strategy produced certain short-term tactical gains, such as increased allied defense spending and migration enforcement cooperation it yielded mixed long-term structural outcomes and introduced risks of escalation, economic disruption, and alliance strain. The paper concludes that Trump’s use of threats underscores both the utility and limitations of coercive statecraft in a highly interdependent international system, contributing to broader debates on the role of power, credibility, and bargaining in contemporary foreign policy.