

## MECHANISMS OF RENT CAPTURE AND DISTRIBUTION IN TARABA STATE'S MINING SECTOR, NIGERIA

**Manga, Joseph**

manga7819@gmail.com

GSM: 07035346727

Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

&

**Tukura, Nashuka Tino, PhD.**

tukura.tino88@gmail.com

GSM: 08026504155

Department of Political Science, Federal University Wukari, Taraba State, Nigeria

### Abstract

The mining sector remains a critical source of economic rents in resource-rich regions; however, the processes through which these rents are captured and distributed often determine whether mineral wealth contributes to sustainable development or reinforces inequality. This paper examines the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State's mining sector, with particular attention to the interaction between formal regulatory frameworks and informal governance practices. Drawing on a political economy and institutional analysis approach, the paper explores how rents are generated through licensing, royalties, taxation, and negotiated agreements, and how these rents are subsequently allocated among state institutions, mining operators, local elites, and host communities. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, the findings reveal that while formal legal and fiscal instruments exist to regulate rent capture, weak enforcement and pervasive informality significantly distort rent distribution. Consequently, a substantial portion of mining rents is captured by a narrow group of actors, thereby limiting the developmental impact of the sector at the state and community levels. The paper recommends reforms aimed at promoting more equitable and sustainable rent distribution in Taraba State's mining sector.

**Keywords:** *Mechanisms, Rent, Capture, Distribution and Mining sector*

### Introduction

Natural resource endowments are widely recognized as double-edged swords: they have the potential to spur economic development but can also generate significant rents and excess returns that accrue beyond the normal profits of investment which, if poorly governed, may undermine sustainable development (Auty, 1993; Ross, 2012). In the context of extractive industries, rent capture refers to the process through which resource rents are secured by various actors, while rent distribution describes how these rents are allocated across stakeholders, including government, firms, and local communities (Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007). Understanding these mechanisms is crucial for ensuring that mining contributes equitably to socio-economic development.

The mining sector in Nigeria has long been identified as an area with untapped potential for contributing to both state and national revenues (Adelekan, 2010). Minerals such as gold, tantalite, and other solid minerals have attracted investors and policymakers' attention due to their capacity to generate rents through licensing, royalties, taxes, and joint-venture agreements (Amankwah & Frimpong, 2014). However, empirical evidence suggests that Nigeria's mineral wealth has not consistently translated into improved development outcomes due to weak institutional frameworks and rent-seeking behaviour among elites (Ayodele & Anifowose, 2016; Obi, 2016). In sub-national settings like Taraba State, which possesses diverse geological formations with exploitable mineral resources, the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution are shaped by both formal regulatory structures and informal practices. Formal mechanisms typically encompass statutory provisions in the *Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act* (2007), fiscal instruments such as royalties and mineral export levies, and institutional roles assigned to state ministries and agencies (Welker, 2009). Yet, the effectiveness of these mechanisms often depends on enforcement capacity, transparency in licensing, and the political economy dynamics of state governance (Bebbington et al., 2008; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010).

Informal mechanisms, on the other hand, include negotiated arrangements between local elites and mining operators, patronage networks, and customary land rights that influence access to mining rents (Hilson, 2017). In many resource-rich developing regions, these informal practices can distort rent distribution by privileging certain groups and marginalizing others, thereby reinforcing inequality and social tension (Pierre, 2013; Lund, 2016). For Taraba State, such dynamics are particularly significant because resource extraction often intersects with ethnic diversity, land tenure complexity, and limited oversight capacity at the local level.

Scholarly work on resource governance highlights the importance of institutional quality and accountability as determinants of how rents are captured and shared. Institutions that enforce transparency in contract awards,

mandate public disclosure of revenue streams, and involve community stakeholders in decision-making tend to distribute rents more equitably (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Cust & Poelhekke, 2015). Conversely, weak oversight and corruption can lead to elite capture where rents are siphoned off through illicit channels before reaching public coffers or community development funds (Black & Rothchild, 2014; Johnston, 2013).

Despite the global advances in understanding resource rent governance, there is limited empirical investigation into how these mechanisms operate at the state level within Nigeria's mining sector, especially in the context of Taraba State. Most existing studies focus on oil and gas rents (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013) or on national-level policy assessments (Aghalino & Eweka, 2010). This gap obscures the localized pathways through which rents are captured and dispersed among government agencies, mining firms, and communities in Taraba.

Thus, analyzing the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba's mining sector is timely and significant. It can illuminate how institutional arrangements, political economy factors, and stakeholder interactions shape the flow of mining rents. Such insights are essential for designing policies that enhance transparency, foster equitable development, and mitigate the risks associated with resource-based rent capture and distribution.

### **Conceptualizing Resource Rents**

Resource rents arise when the returns from natural resources exceed the normal cost of capital and operating expenses, generating economic value that can be captured by states, firms, or local communities (Auty, 1993; Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007). In the context of extractive industries, rents are generated through mechanisms such as royalties, taxes, profit sharing, and licensing fees (Ross, 2012). The study of rent capture and distribution therefore intersects with theories of the resource curse **and** rentier state dynamics, both of which emphasize how resource wealth interacts with governance structures to shape developmental outcomes (Auty, 1993; Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013). In extractive economies, the capture of resource rents typically occurs through formal fiscal and regulatory frameworks. These include mineral rights allocation, royalty regimes, corporate income taxation, production sharing agreements, and fees for exploration and licensing (Amankwah & Frimpong, 2014; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010). For instance, Amankwah and Frimpong (2014) highlight how fiscal incentives can influence both the level of investment and the distribution of rents between host governments and mining companies in African contexts. Similarly, Kolk and van Tulder (2010) argue that corporate governance and international standards, such as transparency initiatives, shape the distributional outcomes in the mining sector.

However, the effectiveness of formal mechanisms depends significantly on institutional quality. Weak regulatory capacity, lack of enforcement, and limited administrative transparency can allow rents that should accrue to the public to be lost through avoidance, corruption, or informal capture (Kolstad & Wiig, 2009; Cust & Poelhekke, 2015). Kolstad and Wiig (2009), in particular, found that institutional weakness in resource-rich countries often results in uneven rent distribution that favors political elites and external investors over local stakeholders. Beyond formal structures, informal mechanisms play a crucial role in how rents are captured and redistributed. Local power brokers, traditional leaders, and informal networks often influence access to mining rights and benefits, especially in contexts where statutory regulation is weak or poorly enforced (Hilson, 2017; Lund, 2016). Hilson (2017) explains that in many African and South American mineral frontiers, artisanal and small-scale mining operations are governed by a mix of statutory law and customary practices, leading to complex pathways of rent capture that are often opaque and exclusionary.

Lund (2016) emphasizes that land tenure systems and local political economies mediate the flow of resource benefits, with social norms and local authority structures shaping bargaining power between communities and mining firms. These dynamics are relevant in sub-national settings like Taraba State, where multi-ethnic communities and layered governance structures may influence how rents are negotiated, claimed, and distributed. Governance reform literature highlights the importance of transparency and accountability mechanisms in improving rent capture outcomes. Initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and standards of corporate social responsibility (CSR) are designed to enhance public disclosure of contracts, payments, and revenue flows to reduce leakage and promote equitable distribution (Bebbington et al., 2008; Kolk & van Tulder, 2010). Bebbington et al. (2008) argue that accountability systems that incorporate community participation and independent monitoring can mitigate the extractive sector's negative impacts while supporting development goals.

Cust and Poelhekke (2015) also show that redistributive policies, including funds earmarked for local development, can influence how resource rents are shared across regions. However, the realization of such mechanisms often depends on political will, institutional capacity, and civil society engagement. In many developing states, including Nigeria, governance shortfalls can limit the effectiveness of transparency initiatives (Ayodele & Anifowose, 2016; Obi, 2016). Much of the literature on resource governance in Nigeria has focused on oil and gas, where rent distribution and institutional conflict have been extensively documented (Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013; Aghalino & Eweka, 2010). These studies illustrate how federal-state revenue sharing, elite

bargaining, and regulatory ambiguity influence who benefits from resource rents. However, less attention has been paid to solid minerals and sub-national mining sectors, particularly in regions such as Taraba State (Ayodele & Anifowose, 2016).

The few studies that examine mining in Nigeria suggest that weak policy implementation, corruption, and low transparency undermine potential rent flows to local communities and state governments (Adelekan, 2010; Obi, 2016). Adelekan (2010) emphasizes that despite reforms in the mining sector, revenue collection systems remain inefficient and poorly integrated with local development planning. Obi (2016) further notes that without strong institutional oversight, mining rents may reinforce patterns of elite capture, where benefits accrue mainly to a narrow political class.

While the broader literature offers important insights into rent capture and distribution mechanisms, there is a clear gap in localized empirical research on how these processes unfold at the state or community level in Nigeria's mining sector. Studies often generalize across countries or focus on national mineral policies, leaving sub-national variations unexplored (Hilson, 2017; Kolstad & Wiig, 2009). For Taraba State, understanding how formal and informal mechanisms interact, and how different stakeholders influence rent flows, is essential for designing policies that enhance equity and accountability. This gap underscores the significance of the present study, which seeks to dissect the specific mechanisms through which rents are captured and distributed in Taraba State's mining sector. By integrating institutional analysis with political economy perspectives, the research can contribute to both academic debates and practical policy frameworks aimed at improving resource governance at the sub-national level.

#### Theoretical Framework

This paper is anchored primarily on Political Economy Theory to explain the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State's mining sector. This theoretical perspective provides a robust framework for understanding how power relations, institutional arrangements, and incentive structures shape access to, control over, and allocation of mining rents. Political Economy Theory emphasizes the interaction between economic processes and political power, particularly how state institutions, elites, and interest groups influence the allocation of scarce resources (Leftwich, 2000; Mosley, Harrigan, & Toye, 1991). In resource-rich contexts, the theory highlights how natural resource rents become objects of political contestation, shaping governance outcomes and development trajectories. Applied to extractive industries, political economy analysis explains rent capture as a function of power asymmetries among actors such as government officials, mining firms, local elites, and host communities (Humphreys et al., 2007). Actors with greater political influence or access to decision-making processes are more likely to shape licensing regimes, taxation policies, and enforcement mechanisms in their favor, enabling elite capture of rents. This aligns with the broader resource curse literature, which argues that weak accountability and high rent availability incentivize rent-seeking behavior rather than productive investment (Auy, 1993; Ross, 2012).

In the context of Taraba State, Political Economy Theory is particularly relevant because mining activities occur within a decentralized governance structure where federal authority over mineral resources intersects with state-level administration and local power relations. The theory helps explain how rents generated through mining licenses, royalties, and informal payments are influenced by political patronage networks, bureaucratic discretion, and negotiated arrangements between mining operators and state or local actors. As a result, rent distribution often reflects political bargaining rather than developmental priorities.

#### Theory Application

The integration of Political Economy Theory allows this paper to systematically analyze the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State's mining sector. Political Economy Theory guides the examination of power relations, elite interests, and political incentives that shape who controls mining rents and how decisions about allocation are made. It enables the study to identify patterns of elite capture, patronage, and exclusion that influence rent outcomes. Indeed, in line with the basic assumptions of the theory, the Political Economy Theory provides a comprehensive explanatory framework that captures the political, institutional, and socio-economic dimensions of rent capture and distribution. Its application enhances the analytical depth of the paper and supports policy-relevant conclusions on how institutional reforms, transparency measures, and inclusive governance arrangements can improve the developmental impact of mining in Taraba State.

#### Discussion of Findings

Mining in Taraba state is overwhelmingly dominated by artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). Studies of Taraba's mining communities document long-standing informal extraction practices, extensive environmental degradation (abandoned pits, erosion), and widespread non-compliance with formal licensing regimes and conditions that create many discretionary rents for local actors. State actors, including governors, security agencies, and environmental committees, periodically use formal instruments such as bans, raids, or temporary moratoria to signal control while simultaneously opening space for negotiated reapportioning of rents. For example, executive orders and occasional enforcement drives in Taraba have been reported and contested by stakeholders calling for lifting bans and retooling arrangements, showing that prohibitory measures become

levers in bargaining over who gets access and who pays (Kehinde, 2023). These selective enforcement actions rarely eliminate activity; rather, they redistribute opportunities to better-connected actors who can pay, negotiate, or supply political support.

On the ground, non-state actors such as local chiefs, gang leaders, transport contractors, comprador middlemen, and miners' cooperatives extract fees, tolls and commissions at multiple points: entry to a site, processing, transport and sale. These informal charges are a form of decentralized rent appropriation that the state tolerates because they stabilize local relations and convert dispersed miners into politically legible groups. In many cases, the fees are shared with local political patrons who broker protection or access, so rents are split according to negotiated claims rather than being monopolized by a single actor. Empirical field studies in Taraba document these layered informal levies and their environmental/social consequences (Ahmed, Tukur, & Dantani, 2020; Ndabula, Abdullahi, & Umar, 2019). Similarly, formal mineral titles and concessions remain important sources of large rents. Where concessions are issued, allocation decisions are typically embedded in patronage networks: elites, political officeholders and allied firms gain preferential access. Political settlements and institutionalist literature show how formal rules are often adapted to serve distributional bargains so states may appear to follow licensing procedures while actually steering valuable titles to allies in exchange for political support or kickbacks. Comparative political-economy work (political settlements) helps explain why formalization does not automatically lead to broad public capture of rents but instead to re-entrenchment of elite bargains (Mustapha, 2021).

. Field reports and case studies of Taraba note the persistence of illegal activity despite enforcement, consistent with such capture-and-redistribution dynamics (Oruonye & Abubakar, 2020; Ahmed et al., 2020). In the same vein, traditional rulers, community leaders and miners' cooperatives become intermediaries that the state uses to routinize payments and manage dispute resolution. Co-optation converts otherwise diffuse claims into structured bargains: the state recognizes certain leaders or cooperatives (or penalizes rival groups) and, in return, those intermediaries deliver miners' acquiescence, extract fees, and transmit a share of rents upward. This lowers enforcement costs for the state and sustains patron-client ties at the local level. Empirical studies in Taraba's mining areas document the centrality of local intermediaries in mediating access to mining sites and distributing benefits (Mustapha, 2021).

Also, multiple reports confirm that raids and seizures remain a recurrent enforcement tool and one that has at times facilitated rent capture rather than transparent recovery to state coffers. Local media and sector reporting document episodes where security forces seized precious stones and arrested suspects, with subsequent local settlements allowing operations to resume or miners to be released after payments or negotiations. For instance, a June 2025 operational report records troops seizing precious stones and arresting suspected illegal miners in Bali LGA, demonstrating both ongoing enforcement intensity and the practical reality of seizures in the region. In the same vein, a regional mining outlet reported that troops seized precious stones and arrested nine illegal miners in Taraba, illustrating how seizures remain a frontline enforcement tactic (Kehinde, 2023). Again, studies specifically focused on Gashaka and the Mambilla Plateau, such as those of Oruonye and Abubakar (2020) and Ahmed et al. (2020), document how traditional leaders and miners' cooperatives act as intermediaries; they collect contributions for local projects, allocate site access, and liaise with state taskforces.

Empirical impact studies and environmental assessments like those of Ndabula et al. (2019) and Oruonye and Abubakar (2020) report widespread degradation, deforestation of forest reserves, abandoned pits, and water quality impacts in affected LGAs. The Taraba State Strategic Assessment / ESIA materials and journalistic investigations highlight that "almost all 22 forest reserves in the State have turned into farmland and mining sites," according to the state taskforce chairman, General Faransa (rtd), a dramatic indicator of ecological conversion associated with unregulated ASM. These environmental costs are a visible externality of negotiated rent regimes that prioritize short-term extraction gains. In a final analysis, mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba's mining sector selective enforcement, informal taxation, elite brokerage of titles, state-facilitated seizure/reallocation, and co-optation of local intermediaries, operate through negotiated bargains between state and non-state actors. These bargains are stabilized by mutual dependence, political incentives to maintain coalitions, and the high costs of comprehensive enforcement; they therefore reproduce a hybrid regime in which formal law is adapted to serve distributional agreements rather than to eliminate informal rent appropriation.

Interview was also conducted to elicit information not gotten through the documents and the report synthesizes findings from qualitative interviews conducted with artisanal miners, community leaders, traditional authorities, security personnel, political office holders, and licensed mining operators across mining communities in Taraba State (Karim Lamido, Wukari, Kurmi, Gashaka, and Sardauna LGAs). The interviews sought to investigate whether mechanisms of rent capture and distribution reflect negotiated arrangements between state and non-state actors. Evidence from all respondent categories strongly validates the study's hypothesis. A total of 20 respondents were interviewed: 6 artisanal/small-scale miners (ASMs), 4 traditional rulers and kingmakers, 3 local government revenue officials, 3 youth leaders involved in mining site supervision, 2 licensed mining operators, and 2 security personnel (NSCDC and local vigilante leadership). Participants were selected through purposive and chain-referral sampling to capture relevant experiences.

Respondents consistently identified a multi-level rent extraction system involving state and non-state actors. These include local government clearance fees, traditional royalty payments to chiefs, youth and vigilante security contributions, state-level mineral monitoring fees, and informal payments to security agents.

**A miner in Wukari LGA stated:**

*“You cannot work here without settling the chief, the youths, and the local government. Everybody has their own share.”* According to him, this layered structure demonstrates an entrenched pattern of shared rent capture, reflecting negotiated arrangements among actors who each claim authority.

Similarly, interviewees revealed that rents are not determined by fixed rules. Instead, they emerge from continuous bargaining based on the relative power of actors (chiefs, LG officials, and youth groups), access to state security actors, political connections, and community acceptance or resistance.

**A youth leader in Karim Lamido LGA explained:**

*“If the chief wants to increase his share, he must negotiate with us and the miners. If not, we block the road.”* This view indicates that rent distribution is shaped through negotiated settlements rather than formal institutional frameworks.

Also, several respondents reported that state agencies (local government staff, Ministry of Mineral Resources officials, police, NSCDC) depend on non-state groups for access, security, and legitimacy.

**A local government official from Ibi LGA noted:**

*“We cannot collect revenues without the youths and elders. They help us enforce the fees.”* He also stated that these arrangements show that state agencies lack independent enforcement capacity and therefore enter into bargains with traditional and community power structures to collect rents.

Respondents consistently agreed that youth groups, chiefs, and community associations leverage bargaining to secure a share of mining proceeds. Many miners stated that youth leaders negotiate their payments directly with government officers or licensed operators.

**A miner in Kurmi LGA said:**

*The government people agree with the youth leaders on what we should pay. After that, we comply.”* According to him, non-state actors co-produce the rent extraction framework, making the system interdependent.

Again, respondents unanimously agreed that disputes over fees, pit ownership, land access, or distribution of proceeds are handled via negotiations involving chiefs, LG officials, youth leaders, and security actors.

**In Sardauna LGA, a licensed operator explained:**

*“When the youths blocked our site, we had to call the chief and the LGA chairman. Everyone sat down and renegotiated the sharing formula.”* He further stated that conflict resolution follows negotiated norms, reinforcing the centrality of bargains in rent distribution.

The interviews reveal that the mining sector in Taraba State is characterized by a network of interdependent actors who jointly shape rent capture and distribution. Formal state structures coexist with traditional authorities, youth groups, community associations, and security actors in a system defined not by statutory regulations but by negotiated bargains. Thus, the hypothesis is strongly validated: the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State indeed reflect ongoing negotiated settlements between state and non-state actors, shaped by power relations, local legitimacy, and practical constraints on state authority.

Questionnaire was administered to obtain information not gotten documents and interviews and the result is illustrated in the table below:

**Table 1:** Mean and Standard deviation of the responses of respondents on the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State’s mining sector.

S/N	Rent capture and distribution mechanisms	N	Mean	S.D	Decision
1	Rent (financial gain) from mining is captured mainly by political elites and government officials	360	3.14	0.61	Agree
2	Local actors and state agencies negotiate resource rents informally outside official channels	360	2.72	0.81	Agree
3	Mining revenues are not equitably shared among local communities	360	3.15	0.73	Agree
4	Agreements between local leaders and mining companies determine rent distribution	360	3.20	0.75	Agree
<b>Cluster Mean</b>		<b>360</b>	<b>3.05</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>Agree</b>

The results presented in Table 1 showed the mean and standard deviations of the responses of *respondents on the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State’s mining sector*. The results showed that items 1, 2, 3 and 4 had mean ratings of 3.14, 2.72, 3.15 and 3.20 with standard deviations of 0.61, 0.81, 0.73 and 0.75, respectively. These mean ratings are above the criterion level of 2.50 set for accepting an item, this means that rent (financial gain) from mining is captured mainly by political elites and government officials, local actors and state agencies negotiate resource rents informally outside official channels, mining revenues are not equitably shared among local communities, and agreements between local leaders and mining companies determine rent distribution. The cluster mean of 3.05 is also above the criterion level of 2.50 set as a benchmark for accepting an item. The cluster mean of 3.05 with a standard deviation of 0.45 showed that respondents consistently agreed that the mechanisms of rent capture and distribution in Taraba State’s mining sector reflect negotiated bargains between state and non-state actors.

### Conclusion

Rent capture and distribution are highly uneven in Taraba State’s mining sector. Elites and intermediaries extract disproportionate benefits, while host communities receive limited compensation and experience environmental degradation, displacement, and livelihood disruptions. This reinforces socio-economic inequality and contributes to recurring disputes among artisanal miners, local communities, and state authorities. Informal mechanisms, such as negotiated access agreements between chiefs and mining operators, sometimes fill governance vacuums by preventing conflict. However, these arrangements are exclusionary in nature, marginalizing women, youth, and other vulnerable groups from decision-making processes and benefits. The state-level political settlement, defined by elite bargains and selective enforcement of regulations, largely determines governance outcomes. Inclusive settlements that integrate community actors and traditional authorities foster relative stability, whereas exclusionary settlements heighten conflict and undermine sustainability. In sum, mining governance in Taraba State is best understood as a negotiated political process in which power, resources, and legitimacy are continuously contested

### Recommendation

Based on the findings, the paper recommends among other things, the promotion of equitable rent distribution by developing community development agreements (CDAs) that allocate a defined share of mining revenues to host communities, institutionalizing transparent benefit-sharing mechanisms to reduce elite capture and ensure inclusivity, particularly for women and youth.

### References

- Adelekan, I. O. (2010). Solid minerals and sustainable development in Nigeria. *Resources Policy*.
- Aghalino, S. O., & Eweka, A. O. (2010). Oil revenue and economic performance in Nigeria. *Global Journal of Human Social Science*.
- Ahmed, Y. M., Tukur, A. L., & Dantani, A. U. (2020). Socioeconomic impact of artisanal and small-scale mining on the Mambilla Plateau of Taraba State, Nigeria. *International Journal of Environmental Studies*, 77(5), 817–832. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207233.2020.1755842> Retrieved on 14 October 2025
- Amankwah, A. A., & Frimpong, S. (2014). Tax incentives and mineral investment in Africa. *Journal of African Business*.
- Auty, R. M. (1993). *Sustaining development in mineral economies: The resource curse thesis*. London, England: Routledge.
- Ayodele, T., & Anifowose, M. (2016). Governance and regulation challenges in Nigeria’s solid minerals sector. *Journal of African Development Studies*, 8(1), 45–61.
- Bebbington, A., Hinojosa, L., Bebbington, D. H., Burneo, M. L., & Warnars, X. (2008). Contention and ambiguity: Mining and the possibilities of development. *World Development*, 36(12), 2888–2905. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2007.11.007>. Retrieved February 15, 2026

- Black, J., & Rothchild, D. (2014). *The governance of resource rents*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
- Cust, J., & Poelhekke, S. (2015). The local economic impacts of natural resource extraction. *Annual Review of Resource Economics*, 7, 251–268. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-resource-100814-125106> Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Hilson, G. (2017). Shootings and burning excavators: Some rapid reflections on the Government of Ghana's handling of the galamsey mining "menace." *Resources Policy*, 54, 109–116. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.resourpol.2017.09.009> Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Humphreys, M., Sachs, J. D., & Stiglitz, J. E. (Eds.). (2007). *Escaping the resource curse*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Johnston, M. (2013). *Syndromes of corruption: Wealth, power, and democracy*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Kehinde, O. (2023). The challenges of enforcing government bans on illegal mining in Nigeria: Evidence from Taraba State. *GPH-International Journal of Social Science*, 6(2), 45–59.
- Kolk, A., & van Tulder, R. (2010). International business, corporate social responsibility and sustainable development. *International Business Review*, 19(2), 119–125. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2009.12.003> Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2009). Is transparency the key to reducing corruption in resource-rich countries? *World Development*, 37(3), 521–532. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2008.07.002> Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Leftwich, A. (2000). *States of development: On the primacy of politics in development*. Cambridge, England: Polity Press.
- Lund, C. (2016). Rule and rupture: State formation through the production of property and citizenship. *Development and Change*, 47(6), 1199–1228. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12274> Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Lund, C. (2016). Rule and rupture: State formation through the production of property and citizenship. *Development and Change*, 47(6), 1199–1228. <https://doi.org/10.1111/dech.12274>
- Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1991). *Aid and power: The World Bank and policy-based lending*. London, England: Routledge.
- Mustapha, A. R. (2021). Political settlements, mining governance and natural resource rents in Nigeria. *Extractive Industries and Society*, 8(2), 100875. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2021.100875> Retrieved on 14 October 2025
- Ndabula, C., Abdullahi, M. A., & Umar, S. (2019). Environmental and socio-economic effects of artisanal mining in Taraba State, Nigeria. *Journal of Environmental Management and Safety*, 10(1), 85–99.
- North, D. C. (1990). *Institutions, institutional change and economic performance*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Obi, C. (2016). Extractive resource governance and conflicts in Africa. *Africa Spectrum*, 51(2), 3–25.
- Oruonye, E. D., & Abubakar, H. (2020). Environmental impacts of artisanal gold mining in Gashaka Local Government Area of Taraba State, Nigeria. *Orion Journal of Physical and Natural Sciences*, 7(1), 47–61.
- Pierre, J. (2013). *The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ross, M. (2012). *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton University Press.
- Sala-i-Martin, X., & Subramanian, A. (2013). Addressing the natural resource curse: An illustration from Nigeria. *Journal of African Economies*, 22(4), 570–615. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jae/ejt017> . Retrieved February 15, 2026
- Welker, M. (2009). *Enacting the Corporation: An American Mining Firm in Postauthoritarian Indonesia*. Duke University Press.